Opening Remarks
by H.E. Yun Byung-se
Minister of Foreign Affairs

June 25, 2015

Members of GEM (젬),
Executive Secretary Zerbo,
Distinguished guests,
Ladies and gentlemen,

Today, as we speak, the Doomsday Clock is at three minutes to midnight, the closest ever since the end of the Cold War. This is a hair-trigger state of affairs, to which many have become blindingly numb. In fact, last month when the 2015 NPT Review Conference concluded without a final document, I was worried the Clock would tick even closer to midnight.

My remarks may sound ominous, but this isn’t going to be a “gloom and doom” speech. Rather, my point is that now is the time for us to take stock of developments in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, and chart our future course of action.

And I say this as someone with a special attachment to disarmament and non-proliferation issues. As the Minister at the Korean Mission in Geneva fifteen years ago, I was actively engaged in a host of conferences and negotiations, including the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the Verification Protocol of the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) at the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Even now, as Foreign Minister, I find that experience invaluable. For me, the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime is an intricate canvas laced with political, legal and technical features – for instance, the security consideration of states, universally applicable legal norms and the implementation and verification mechanisms underpinning the whole system.

For sure, this system was not created out of a political vacuum. It is the outcome of close international cooperation under favorable circumstances. Indeed, we can recall the post-Cold War period as a high-water mark, a time of hope for a virtuous cycle of disarmament and non-proliferation reinforcing global peace and security: first, indefinitely extending the NPT in 1995, second, opening the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996 and third, bringing the Chemical Weapons Convention into force in 1997.

In particular, at that time, the CTBT was speedily negotiated and the international community warmly welcomed its noble goals – i.e., curbing the development of nuclear weapons, setting up an international monitoring and verification mechanism, thereby ultimately leading us to usher in a nuclear zero world. It was rightly hailed as a historic milestone in strengthening the rule of law in nuclear non-proliferation, and as a major pillar for a more robust NPT system.

However, nineteen years on, the CTBT has yet to become law. It still remains a “sleeping beauty,” bidding its time to wield its great potential. Even UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Chairman of the CTBTO PrepCom back in 1999, has expressed dismay and disappointment at this delay.

The ramifications of this situation are being felt around the world, but nowhere more acutely than in the Korean peninsula. Indeed, North Korea is the only country to have conducted nuclear weapon tests in the 21st century. At present, its nuclear weapons programs are the most serious challenge to the global non-proliferation regime. Despite international efforts, it is going down a misguided and anachronistic path, arguing that it can have both guns and butter.

Last March, North Korea chose the recent Conference on Disarmament meeting to unabashedly declare itself as “the youngest nuclear weapon state,” and to threaten it could conduct a pre-emptive nuclear strike. And last month, its submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) ejection test hit the headlines, an example of its efforts to upgrade nuclear and missile capabilities.

Needless to say, for North Korea, guaranteeing security through nukes is, and will remain, a pipe dream. I truly hope they will soon wake up and open their eyes to reality: nukes bring nothing but isolation and sanctions. The international community has a cast-iron commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, and will not accept a nuclear armed North Korea. Pyongyang would do well to take a lesson from the Iranian case and return to the dialogue table.

If North Korea signs and ratifies the CTBT, it would send a strong signal in the path towards denuclearization. Indeed, Security Council Resolution 1874(2009), adopted in the wake of Pyongyang’s second nuclear test, urges it to do so.

As for the Republic of Korea, not only have we already ratified the CTBT, but we are also actively participating in international efforts to strengthen the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. In 2012, we hosted the Nuclear Security Summit. From 2013 to 2014, we chaired the 1540 Committee as a member of the Security Council. Furthermore, from 2016 to 2017, we will chair the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

We are trying to strengthen the international regime, while nudging North Korea to make a right strategic decision, to give up its nukes. In our view, North Korea’s nuclear conundrum is after all part of the North Korea question. So, we are working to make the efforts for North Korea’s denuclearization and peace-building on the Korean peninsula mutually reinforcing. And our door for inter-Korean dialogue remains wide open.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Seventy years after the end of the Second World War, we are witnessing the “return of geopolitics” as well as remnants of the Cold War style zero-sum mindset around the world. This kind of approach would be especially counter-productive in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament.

And twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War, we in Northeast Asia are still living under its shadows. We need to improve the security landscape by strengthening non-proliferation efforts in this part of the world.

In this regard, it is crucial to prioritize the entry into force of the CTBT. But this is easier said than done. Breaking nearly two decades of inertia and intransigence will require out-of-the-box thinking. For the CTBT, eight is the magic number. The U.S. and China, two among the remaining eight, have shown their capacity for compromise in fields such as climate change. This is something that the CTBT urgently needs too.

Reaching out to the holding-out eight would also be necessary. Secretary-General Ban has floated the idea of a joint outreach campaign with the Executive Secretary. The CTBTO’s two-decades-long track record of monitoring and on-site inspections will be effective assets in any such campaign. In particular, a special high-level meeting to mark the 20th anniversary of the CTBT in 2016 with a view to facilitating its entry into force warrants our serious consideration.

So, let me assure you this: to help the CTBT come into effect, the Republic of Korea will spare no efforts. And to achieve the vision of a nuclear zero world, Korea will play its part as a true partner.

In closing, I sincerely hope that the experience, insights and wisdom you will share today and tomorrow will lead us toward realizing our common goals for the CTBT.

Thank you very much. /끝/